As indicated in a previous post, the failure to elect a Greek President has forced the calling of a new election on Jan 25. The expectation is that it will be won by Syriza, a neo-Marxist Party, much like the 'Occupy Wall Street' crowd. Greece is in an untenable position. Social Democracy (Capitalism for the few and Socialism for the many) had produced six years of recession, 1.5M unemployed, 3M heading into abject poverty and a majority who can not pay their bills. The Country has been kept afloat by the loans of the troika (the IMF, the ECB and the EU). A debt payment of 20B Euros is due at the end of February. Greek banks have enough funds to make it through February, but after that they must be bailed out again.
Into this mess marches Syriza. It promises an end to the policy of austerity, renegotiating the terms of the bailouts and staying within the EU.
Will these changes solve the problems of Greece? NO! First, the mechanics of the change are not doable. Even if Syriza wins, it will have to form a coalition government and renegotiate the terms of its indebtedness - all in a month. What if the Troika bulks, which is likely?
What is the Greek problem and the possible solution? Simply put: Greek products are not competitive. Greek products are too expensive due to Socialist practices. In addition, Greece is tied to a strong currency, the Euro, so it can not devalue its currency in order to sell its products at more competitive prices. The obvious solution then is for Greece to leave the EU and the Euro and slowly privatize its industries and reduce the size of its government.
Will this happen? NO! Syriza being a Marxist Party will try to seize the wealth of top earners and remain in the EU. That will still leave Greek products uncompetitive, spending will increase and stagnation will continue. That is the optimistic scenario. The pessimistic scenario is chaos and civil war.
Many global investors limited to investment grade markets or developed markets, as defined by MSCI have no direct exposure to Greece. Nevertheless, recent developments in Greece are worrisome to investors. Many fear that the political challenges in Greece could lead to its ultimate exit from the monetary union and default.
This concern has led dramatic loss in Greek bonds and stocks. Today's decline in Greek stocks (10.2%) is the largest since 1987. The 70 bp rise in the benchmark 10-year yield is among the largest of the year.
There have been a sequence of three issues that have forced the issue to the fore. First, over the weekend, the Greek Parliament approved the 2015 budget by 155-134 votes. The budget was opposed by the official creditors, the Troika (the IMF, EU, ECB), which had been seeking another 1.7 bln euro in budget savings. The government's budget went the opposite direction. It included relief from the tax on heating oil and the income tax surcharge. It assumed growth would be just shy of 3.0% next year.
Second, the eurozone finance ministers blocked efforts by Greek Prime Minister Samaras to exit the assistance program. Samaras was eager to exit and restore some of its sovereignty ahead of what will likely be elections in the early part of next year. Instead, a two month extension of the existing program was granted, pending final approval. This would be followed by a precautionary line of credit from the ESM. This may force the Greek government to amend its budget before the EU grants its necessary approval.
These two developments set the backdrop for the third. Samaras has brought forward the selection of next Greek President. This was expected next February. The issue is that to select the President, a super-majority in parliament is needed. The government commands 155 votes of the 300-seat chamber.
The first round will be held December 17. The presidential candidate needs to secure 200 votes. If that fails, which is most certainly will, a second round will be held five days later on December 22. If the candidate fails to secure 200 votes then, a third round will be held a week later. On the third try, the candidate needs to secure 180 votes. If this fails, general elections will be held. The anti-austerity, and at times, anti-EMU Syriza Party is ahead in the national polls. Hence the existential concerns.
Samaras has very little room to maneuver. The core opposition is divided into three parties. Syriza itself has 71 seats. The neo-fascist Golden Dawn has 16 seats. The Communist Party has 12 seats. These combined 99 seats will likely oppose the government every step of the way. That leaves 46 seats in theory from which government needs 25 to secure the 180 votes needed for the third round.
It is possible but the task is daunting. Moreover, it means investors should be prepared for brinkmanship tactics. The value of the 25 needed votes is the greatest in the third and final round of the parliamentary selection process. Samaras has nominated former EU Commissioner and Greek foreign minister Stavros Dimas as the next president. The merits or de-merits of the candidate are not really being discussed. It is not a question of principles but of politics.
The fact that Greece is running a primary budget surplus (which excluded debt servicing costs), it is a better negotiating position with its creditors. In past, when some debtors began running a primary budget surplus they were more likely to seek debt restructuring. Greece's situation is a bit different because debt held by private investors was already restructured. The lion's share of Greece debt is now in official hands.
Tspiras, the head of Syriza has indicated he seeks a restructuring of the debt held by the ECB, EU and IMF. There are more than one way this can be delivered in a negotiated settlement. The least likely way is debt forgiveness. However, there is plenty of precedent for the official sector to lengthen maturities and reduce debt servicing costs. This seems to be a more promising path and one that the EU and ECB seemed open too, provided Greece adheres to its other commitment and delivers a sustained primary budget surplus. A unilateral default, which some observers suggest is possible or even likely, does not appear to be the most probable scenario.
We maintain, as we did consistently during the initial Greek crisis, that as difficult as it is for Greece inside EMU, it would be worse to drop out. Dropping out of EMU appears to be a pre-condition for, and necessitate, default. The new and weaker currency would make repaying euros, which the external debt would be denominated in, unbearable. Private sector (businesses) euro obligations would also likely face default. It would trigger an new and more severe banking crisis, as there would not be a backstop for it. This developments would fuel high inflation and a deep economic downturn.
While peripheral bonds yields are higher today and core bonds lower, the moves are orderly and rather modest, if one were to place much credence on the more pessimistic view of Syriza leading Greece into out of EMU and into default. The euro itself has moved higher today, which is also not what one would expect if Greece's departure was so likely.